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MEDICALIZATION OF AGING: THE UPSIDE AND 
THE DOWNSIDE 
Winsor C. Schmidt* 
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION OF MEDICALIZATION 
The purpose of this article is to describe and assess the upside 
and the downside of the medicalization of aging. 
The idea of medicalization was formulated to theorize about 
the expansion of medicine in people’s lives.1  Medicalization is 
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includes courses on health law and policy, mental health law, aging 
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 1.  Adele Clarke et al., Biomedicalization: Technoscientific Transformations of 
Health, Illness, and U.S. Biomedicine, 68 AM. SOC. REV. 161, 164 (2003) (citing Irving 
Zola, Medicine as an Institution of Social Control, 20 SOC. REV. 487, 487 (1972)); Peter 
Conrad & Kristin K. Barker, The Social Construction of Illness: Key Insights and Policy 
Implications, 51 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. S67, S74 (2010).  See generally ADELE 
CLARKE ET AL., BIOMEDICALIZATION: TECHNOSCIENCE, HEALTH, AND ILLNESS IN THE 
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perceived to occur when a “morally problematic” social problem 
moves from the domain of law to the jurisdiction of medicine.2 
The morally problematic aspect of such medicalized social 
problems suggests irresolution in application of a legal 
paradigm or a medical paradigm, or in the continuum in 
between, and irresolution in application of legal values and 
medical values.  Medicalization is defined as “a process by 
which nonmedical problems become defined and treated as 
medical problems, usually in terms of illness and disorders.”3 
EXAMPLES OF MEDICALIZATION: MEDICALIZATION OF DEVIANCE 
Early medicalization analyses addressed the medicalization of 
deviance, i.e., the movement from dealing with a social problem 
through law to dealing with a problem through medicine.4 
Traditional social “deviants” transitioned from “bad” to “sick” 
included: those subject to divestment from the criminal law (e.g., 
incompetents to stand trial, insanity acquittees, incompetents to 
serve a sentence); the “mentally retarded”; the mentally ill; 
juvenile and “defective” delinquents; psychopaths; drug addicts; 
alcoholics; and the eugenically sterilized.5  More recent and 
continuing medicalized social deviance includes: mental illness; 
alcoholism; opiate addiction; delinquency; hyperactivity; child 
abuse; homosexuality; the born criminal (also, the redefinition of 
 
U.S. (Adele Clarke et al. eds., 2010); IVAN ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE 
EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH (Random House 1976) (1975).    
 2.  Clarke et al., supra note 1, at 164. 
 3.  PETER CONRAD, THE MEDICALIZATION OF SOCIETY: ON THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN CONDITIONS INTO TREATABLE DISORDERS 4 (2007). 
 4.  See, e.g., PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W. SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND 
MEDICALIZATION: FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS 17–18 (Temple University 1992) 
(1980). 
 5.  See NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND 
ENFORCED THERAPY 2 (1971); KENT S. MILLER, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL 
HEALTH SYSTEMS: CONFLICT AND COLLUSION 15 (1980).  See generally TALCOTT 
PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM, at vii (1951). 
An earlier version of notes 5–8, 17–23, 104–12, 129–48, and accompanying text 
previously appeared in W.C. Schmidt, Law and Aging: Mental Health Theory 
Approach, in THEORIES ON LAW AND AGEING: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ELDER LAW 121 
(I. Doran ed., 2009). 
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violence as a public health or medical problem);6 AIDS; domestic 
violence; co-dependency; learning disabilities; eating disorders; 
compulsive gambling; transsexualism; menopause; 
premenstrual syndrome; infertility; suicide; impaired 
physicians; post-traumatic stress disorder; and obesity; as well 
as andropause; baldness; and erectile dysfunction;7 and genetic 
mutation, malfunction, and enhancement.8 
MEDICALIZATION AND THE MEDICAL INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
The machinery of medicalization has mushroomed from medical 
and allied health professionals, organizations, and social 
movements to consumers, biotechnology, and the insurance 
industry, as well as the pharmaceutical industry.9  Politico-
economic developments in 1971 generated a medical industrial 
complex that begins to rival President Eisenhower’s 1950s 
military industrial complex.10 If the military industrial complex 
is the “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a 
large arms industry,”11 then the medical industrial complex is 
 
 6.  E.g., CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 34; Michael Fendrich, 358 N. 
ENG. J. MED. 2081, 2082 (2008) (reviewing CONRAD, supra note 3, and noting that 
Conrad inexplicably omitted the trend to redefine violence as a public health or 
medical problem).   
 7.  CONRAD, supra note 3, at 5–6. Cf., e.g., Barbara Marshall, Science, Medicine 
and Virility Surveillance: ‘Sexy Seniors’ in the Pharmaceutical Imagination, 32 SOC. 
HEALTH & ILLNESS 211, 211 (2009) (describing the emerging cultural consensus on 
maintenance of active sexuality as successful aging marker, including continued 
sexual activity across the lifespan, linkage of sexual function to overall health, and 
encouragement of increased self-surveillance and medical attention to late-life 
sexuality; calling for “continued critical inquiry into the biomedical construction of 
sex and age”).  
 8.  See Peter Conrad, The Shifting Engines of Medicalization, 46 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAV. 3, 7 (2005).  
 9.  Conrad & Barker, supra note 1, at S74.  See generally Anne E. Figert, The 
Consumer Turn in Medicalization: Future Directions with Historical Foundations, in 
HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH, ILLNESS, AND HEALING 291 (Bernice A. 
Pescosolido et al. eds., 2011) (highlighting “the role of individuals in the 
medicalization process and their redefinition from patients into consumers.”).  
 10.  See Clarke et al., supra note 1, at 167. 
 11.  President Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 17, 
1960), available at http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm.  President Eisenhower said:  
 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of 
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the conjunction of an immense medical establishment and a 
large medical/pharmaceutical industry.12  Conrad and Barker 
highlight the increasing importance of commercial medicine, 
“especially the pharmaceutical industry,” in promoting their 
products through configuring and distributing “medical 
knowledge.”13 
Harrington and Estes describe the medical industrial 
complex as including “private profit-making insurance 
companies, health maintenance organizations, hospitals, 
physician groups, pharmaceutical companies, medical supply 
companies, and other health-related businesses, all of which 
have a vested interest in maintaining the current social structure 
and health system.”14  In contrast, Dr. Relman in 1980 specified a 
“new” medical industrial complex that is “a large and growing 
network of private corporations engaged in the business of 
supplying health-care services to patients for a profit —services 
heretofore provided by nonprofit institutions or individual 
practitioners.  I am not referring to the companies that 
manufacture pharmaceuticals or medical equipment and 
supplies.”15 Public and non-profit medical entities, and 
manufacturers, arguably should not be excluded from the 
medical industrial complex any more than President Eisenhower 
excluded public and non-profit military entities, and 
 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-
industrial complex.  The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced 
power exists and will persist.  We must never let the weight of this 
combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.  We should 
take nothing for granted.  Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can 
compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery 
of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and 
liberty may prosper together. 
Id. 
 12.  Cf. BARBARA EHRENREICH & JOHN EHRENREICH, THE AMERICAN HEALTH 
EMPIRE: POWER, PROFITS, AND POLITICS 29 (Vintage Books Ed. 1971) (first coining 
the term “medical industrial complex”).  
 13.  Conrad & Barker, supra note 1, at S74. 
 14.  HEALTH POLICY: CRISIS AND REFORM IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 
SYSTEM 153 (Charlene Harrington & Carroll L. Estes, eds., 5th ed. 2008). 
 15.  Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 963, 963 (1980).  
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manufacturers, from the military industrial complex.  Regarding 
a disquieting partnership of the military and medical industrial 
complexes, Clarke and Shim cite the emergence of the 
biomedicalization of defense with biomedical approaches to 
weaponry and warfare development including the 
technoscientific biological alteration of warriors and 
biosecurity.16 
AGING, SOCIAL DEVIANCE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
A critical view of law and aging, or elder law, sees growing old 
as a form of social deviance: “the elderly are punished by 
isolation and stigmatization for this ‘deviant’ act.”17 Disvalued 
persons like the handicapped and the old are told they are 
normal and encouraged to act like they are normal while social 
organization precludes normalcy and acceptance.18 For example, 
while Social Security achieved a positive sea change in the 
incidence of poverty and quality of life for the elderly, its 
passage also authoritatively established the elderly as a new 
category of deviants.19 
 
 16.  Adele E. Clarke & Janet Shim, Medicalization and Biomedicalization Revisited: 
Technoscience and Transformations of Health, Illness and American Medicine, in 
HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH, ILLNESS, AND HEALING, supra note 9, at 
190.  But cf. Tait R. Medina & Ann McCranie, Layering Control: Medicalization, 
Psychopathy, and the Increasing Multi-institutional Management of Social Problems, in 
HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH, ILLNESS, AND HEALING, supra note 9, at 
139 (discussing increased “criminalization” of mental illness and increased 
medicalization of criminal behavior as demonstrative of layering institutional 
control and increasing multi-institutional management of social problems rather 
than medicine becoming more dominant than law and religion). 
 17.  JOHN B. WILLIAMSON ET AL., AGING AND PUBLIC POLICY: SOCIAL CONTROL 
OR SOCIAL JUSTICE? 4 (1985).  See also Carroll L. Estes & Elizabeth A. Binney, The 
Biomedicalization of Aging: Dangers and Dilemmas, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 587 (1989); 
Margaret Lock, Licorice in Leviathan: The Medicalization of Care for the Japanese Elderly, 
8 CULTURE, MED. & PSYCHIATRY 121 (1984).   
 18.  WILLIAMSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 29.   
 19.  Id. at 105. Social Security is a social insurance program, a safety net of 
income support and maintenance, and of economic security.  As the largest source 
of income for older persons, 88% of Americans over age 65 received benefits in 
2005.  Of these beneficiaries, 69% received over half their income from Social 
Security; 40% received over 90% of their income from Social Security; and for 25% 
Social Security is their only source of income. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON 
MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDER LAW 151–61 (4th ed. 2007).  
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The functions of Social Security for stabilizing the social 
order and thus social control were many . . . . : 
unemployment was reduced, old people were to 
support the economy through consumption, they were 
to serve as both positive and negative role models for 
others, and the political steam they had gathered in 
working for change was to be diffused.  Less obvious 
consequences of this process were solidification of age 
norms and the creation of numerous administrators, 
caretakers, and experts [“an aging enterprise”] who 
were to make their livings, their profits, and their 
reputations off of the elderly.20 
Instead of income support for all, Social Security, like Medicare 
later, achieved income support for some.  “Social Security 
launched a process by which a primary deviation, old age, 
became a secondary deviation – one with definite role 
expectations, not the least of which was exit from the labor 
force.”21 Loss of employment implies disability and moral 
deficiency.22 “[D]isability connotes an incapacity to perform role 
expectations and is very much in keeping with the medical 
model of social control.”23 
Medicalization is “strongly evaluative,” suggesting “how 
people ought to behave,” and results in “policies that authorize 
social control.”24 Conrad and Barker observe: “[s]pecifically, 
medical sociologists point to the contingent processes by which 
certain behaviors and experiences come to be defined as medical 
conditions, and the way [in which] those definitions can 
function as a type of social control.”25 For medical social control, 
Conrad confirms that “the greatest social control power comes 
from having the authority to define certain behaviors, persons 
and things.”26 A key issue is definitional: “the power to have a 
 
Regarding the role of Medicare in positively changing the incidence of poverty 
and quality of life for the elderly, cf. infra text accompanying footnotes 58–60. 
 20.  WILLIAMSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 105, 109. 
 21.  Id. at 110–11.  
 22.  Id. at 111. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Conrad & Barker, supra note 1, at S75. 
 25.  Id. at S68. 
 26.  Conrad, supra note 3, at 8 (internal citations omitted). 
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particular set of (medical) definitions realized in both spirit and 
practice.”27 
MEDICALIZATION OF AGING 
In 1989, Estes and Binney documented the establishment of 
aging as a medical problem (a “pathology”) viewed and 
managed as clinical phenomena.28 The “biomedicalization” of 
aging fosters a public opinion tendency “to view aging 
negatively as a process of inevitable decline, disease, and 
irreversible decay” necessitating medical intervention.29 
“Medicine today is considered the right (and perhaps the only) 
tool for managing the problems of aging.”30 In the social 
environment, “[f]rom cosmetic surgery to knee and hip 
replacement, from hormone replacement therapy to the newest 
drugs for impotence, memory enhancement, and osteoporosis, 
the biotechnological practices—and promises—of slowing the 
aging process are ubiquitous.”31 
In 2004, Kaufman and colleagues reported the exponential 
growth of life-extending medical interventions in late-life (e.g., 
cardiac procedures, kidney dialysis, and transplants) and the 
difficulty of saying “no”.32 Intensification of the 
biomedicalization of aging is associated with the overshadowing 
of choice by routine medical care; “the transformation of the 
technological imperative to a moral imperative; and [ ] the 
coupling of hope with the normalization and routinization of 
life-extending interventions.”33 In summary: 
 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  See ESTES & BINNEY, supra note 17. 
 29.  Id. at 594.  Cf., e.g., Richard J. Hodes & Megan J. Homer, Aging Research: 
Translating Scientific Discovery into Clinical Intervention, 2 WORLD MED. & HEALTH 
POL’Y, no. 4 at 7 (2010).  
 30.  Sharon R. Kaufman et al., Revisiting the Biomedicalization of Aging: Clinical 
Trends and Ethical Challenges, 44 GERONTOLOGIST 731, 731 (2004).  
 31.  Id. at 736 (citation omitted). See also Wendy Glauser, Seniors 
Overmedicalized, Experts Say, 183 CAN. MED. ASS’N J., no. 11 at E701 (2011); Marshall, 
supra note 7. 
 32.  Kaufman et al, supra note 30, at 731–34. 
 33.  Id. at 731. 
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Developments in the realms of biomedical science and 
geriatric clinical intervention, specifically, affect our 
understanding of the nature of late life, individual and 
societal decision making, and family and medical 
responsibility in ways that could not have been 
predicted, even 15 years ago.  Medical interventions are 
reshaping norms of aging and standard clinical 
practice.  The body seems open to unlimited 
manipulation, at any age, and the emphasis . . . is on 
the management and maximization of life itself.  
Medicine is producing a discourse of both senescence 
and life extension—that is, a framework for thinking 
about, speaking about, and understanding the arc, end, 
and prolongation of life.34 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEDICALIZATION OF AGING 
The definition, description, and history of the medicalization of 
aging provide at least implicit initial assessments of the 
downside of medicalization.  Further assessment is gleaned from 
application to the medicalization of aging of the fundamental 
concerns in health law and policy: cost, quality, access, and 
personhood.  What role does the medicalization of aging play 
“in promoting the quality of health care, . . . in assuring 
adequate control of the cost of health care, in promoting access 
to necessary health care, and in protecting the human rights of 
those who are provided care within the health care system”35 
and within the “aging enterprise”?36 What role does the 
medicalization of aging play regarding cost, quality, access, and 
personhood in aging and health care, and in aging services? 
 
 34.  Id. at 732 (internal citations omitted).  Cf. John Albert Vincent, Ageing, Anti-
ageing, and Anti-anti-ageing: Who are the Progressives in the Debate on the Future of 
Human Biological Ageing?, 1 MED. STUD. 197 (2009) (describing the anti-ageing 
movement as a route by which biologisation of old age inhibits people’s 
achievement of a culturally valued final part of life). See generally Jennifer R. 
Fishman et al., In the Vanguard of Biomedicine? The Curious and Contradictory Case of 
Anti-ageing Medicine, 32 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 197 (2010) (discussing that anti-
ageing medicine is built on a technology of the self with the ultimate goal being an 
optimal self, not just a self free from illness). 
 35.  BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, at v (6th ed. 2008). 
 36.  WILLIAMSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 109 (regarding the aging enterprise).   
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ASSESSMENT OF THE MEDICALIZATION OF AGING: COST 
Conrad and colleagues have estimated the costs of 
medicalization generally.37 Medicalized conditions in the 
medicalization cost estimate were selected on the basis of (1) 
identification of the condition as medicalized in any study 
published since 1950, and (2) the availability of “reasonably 
valid and current data on US . . . medical expenditures for that 
condition.”38 Twelve medicalized conditions were selected: 
anxiety disorders; behavioral disorders; body image (cosmetic, 
not bariatric surgery); erectile dysfunction; infertility; male 
pattern baldness; menopause; normal pregnancy and/or 
delivery; normal sadness; obesity (bariatric surgery and weight 
loss medications); sleep disorders; and substance related 
disorders.39 Of these twelve medicalized conditions, only 
infertility and normal pregnancy and/or delivery appear 
unrelated to medicalization of aging. 
The estimated cost of U.S. medical spending on medicalized 
conditions was $77 billion in 2005, which was 3.9% of the $1.97 
trillion in total national health spending (16% of gross domestic 
product (GDP)).40 While “a relatively minor portion of medical 
care expenditures . . . is unlikely to be a key driver of spiraling 
health care costs,” the $77 billion is more than the $56.7 billion 
reportedly spent on heart disease and the $39.9 billion 
reportedly spent on cancer in 2000, and greater than the 
estimated three percent of health spending allocated to public 
health in 2005.41 For 2009, 3.9% spent on medicalization is an 
extrapolated $97.5 billion of the reported $2.5 trillion (17.6% of 
 
 37.  Peter Conrad et al., Estimating the Costs of Medicalization, 70 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 1943, 1943 (2010). 
 38.  Id. at 1943–44. 
 39.  Id. at 1944. 
 40.  Id. at 1943, 1946. 
 41.  Id. at 1946. Cf. Glen P. Mays & Sharla A. Smith, Evidence Links Increases in 
Public Health Spending to Declines in Preventable Deaths, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1585 (2011) 
(finding that mortality rates declined between 1.1% and 6.9% for each 10% increase 
in local public health funding). 
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GDP) in U.S. health care spending.42 
There are other cost measures with some association to the 
medicalization of aging.  Total Medicare spending in 2009 was 
$502.9 billion for the eligible elderly and disabled beneficiaries, 
20% of total national health spending.43 Persons age sixty-five 
and over were only 12.9% of the national population.44 Elderly 
and disabled beneficiaries were only about 14% of the national 
population.45 
Total federal and state Medicaid spending in 2009 was 
$373.9 billion, 15% of national health spending.46  The elderly 
were 10.2% of Medicaid enrollees47 and accounted for 24.7% of 
Medicaid payments in 2007.48 Medicaid paid for 48.9% of long-
term care services in the U.S. in 2005; Medicare paid for 20.4%.49 
If aging includes the chronological passage of time, rather 
than just age sixty-five and over (i.e., a process rather than a 
category group), the disabled were 15.1% of Medicaid enrollees 
in 2007,50 and accounted for 42.4% of Medicaid payments.51 
However, compared to almost all other OECD 
 
 42.  See Anne Martin et al., Recession Contributes to Slowest Annual Rate of 
Increase in Health Spending in Five Decades, 30 HEALTH AFF. 11, 11 (2011). 
 43.  Id. Cf. NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., UNDERSTANDING U.S. 
HEALTH CARE SPENDING 1, 6 (July 2011)  (stating that five percent of the population 
is responsible for almost fifty percent of all spending; half of people in top five 
percent have hypertension, one-third have lipid disorders (high cholesterol), more 
than one-quarter have diabetes). 
 44.  State and County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts. 
census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (as of Oct. 19, 2011 
QuickFacts page updated with 2010 census information).   
 45.  See FURROW ET AL., supra note 35, at 776 (“Medicare covers nearly . . . one in 
seven Americans”). 
 46.  National Health Expenditure Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/25_NHE_Fact_sheet.asp. 
 47.  Distribution of Medicaid Enrollees by Enrollment Group, FY2007, KAISER STATE 
HEALTH FACTS, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=200& 
cat=4 (last visited Aug. 24, 2011). 
 48.  Distribution of Medicaid Payments by Enrollment Group (in millions), FY2007, 
KAISER STATE HEALTH FACTS, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable. 
jsp?ind=858&cat=4 (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).   
 49.  National Clearinghouse for Long-Term Care Information, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS. http://www.longtermcare.gov/LTC/Main_Site/Paying_LTC/ 
Costs_Of_Care/Costs_Of_Care.aspx (last visited Sep. 3, 2011). 
 50.  Distribution of Medicaid Enrollees by Enrollment Group, supra note 47.  
 51.  Distribution of Medicaid Payments by Enrollment Group, supra note 48.  
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(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
countries, the U.S. has one of the smallest proportions of 
population over age sixty-five and the highest percentage of 
GDP spending on health care.52 While per capita U.S. spending 
for people age sixty-five and older is three to five times higher 
than for younger Americans, population age is not the major 
driver of health care cost.53 The principal factors responsible for 
growth in health care spending include: 
[R]ising per capita incomes, the availability of 
promising but costly new medical technology, 
workforce shortages that can drive up the unit cost of 
health care, and the asymmetric distribution of market 
power in health care that gives the supply side of the 
sector considerable sway over the demand side.  These 
other factors will be the dominant drivers of health 
spending in the future as well.  Blaming Medicare’s 
future economic pressures mainly on demographic 
factors beyond policymakers’ control is an evasion of 
more important challenges.54 
Half of the annual per capita health care spending growth in 
2002 “‘is accounted for explicitly by technology (here called 
‘utilization’ and defined to include the ‘quality and mix of 
services’).  Moreover, some of the second-largest component, 
medical price increases, almost surely includes some changes in 
the nature of the product.”55 
 
 52.  Joseph White, (How) Is Aging a Health Policy Problem?, 4 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 47, 50 (2004). 
 53.  Uwe E. Reinhardt, Does the Aging of the Population Really Drive the Demand 
for Health Care?, 22 HEALTH AFF., Nov. 2003 at 27, 27.  See also Gerard F. Anderson et 
al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States is So Different from Other Countries, 22 
HEALTH AFF., May 2003 at 89, 91; Cynthia X. Pan et al., Myths of the High Medical 
Cost of Old Age and Dying, 38 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 253, 254 (2008); Peter Zweifel et 
al., Ageing of Population and Health Care Expenditure: A Red Herring?, 8 HEALTH 
ECON. 485, 485 (1999). 
 54.  Reinhardt, supra note 53, at 37. 
 55.   Mark V. Pauly, Competition and New Technology, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1523, 1524 
(2005). 
But cf., e.g., Kenneth E. Thorpe & David H. Howard, The Rise in Spending Among 
Medicare Beneficiaries: The Role Of Chronic Disease Prevalence and Changes in Treatment 
Intensity, 25 HEALTH AFF. W378, W385 (2006) (“Virtually all of the growth in 
spending from 1987 to 2002 can be traced to the twenty-percentage-point increase in 
the share of Medicare patients receiving medical treatment for five or more 
conditions during a year.”); id. at W379 (Areas giving rise to chronic disease 
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On the upside of the medicalization of aging, as well as the 
medicalization of persons with disabilities, “Medicaid [and 
Medicare] [are], in a very real sense, the cost that we pay as a 
society for valuing the lives of these persons.”56  This cost is a 
tangible, economic value of personhood.  There are other 
personhood measures: “the moral test of government is how [it] 
treats those who are in the dawn of life, the children; those who 
are in the twilight of life, the [aged]; and those in the shadows of 
life – the sick, the needy and the handicapped.”57 
Before Medicare, only fifty-six percent of the elderly were 
insured for hospital care, and nonwhite and poor elderly 
received less health care than white and wealthier elderly.58 With 
Medicare, more equitable access to medical care is available to 
beneficiaries otherwise probably uninsured.  Sixty percent of 
elderly beneficiaries have Social Security for the majority of their 
income, and fifty percent of Medicare beneficiaries have incomes 
equal to or less than 200% of the federal poverty level.59 
Medicare and Medicaid provide health insurance for virtually 
all Americans age sixty-five and older.60 Medicare reduces racial 
 
prevalence include “metabolic syndrome” and “more aggressive use of medication 
to treat asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic patients.  Metabolic syndrome 
[includes] three of the following five conditions: abnormal levels of glucose, low 
high-density lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol, elevated blood pressure, high 
triglyceride levels, and abdominal obesity.”)  
 56.  Furrow et al., supra note 35, at 830. 
 57.  123 CONG. REC. 37287 (1977) (remarks of Hubert Humphrey at the 
dedication of the Hubert H. Humphrey Building). 
 58.  FURROW ET AL., supra note 35, at 777.  
 59.  Id. Cf. Sandro Galea et al., Estimated Deaths Attributable to Social Factors in the 
United States, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1456, 1462 (2011) (Approximately 133,000 
deaths in the U.S. in 2000 were attributable to individual-level poverty and 39,000 to 
area-level poverty compared with 192,898 deaths from acute myocardial infarction, 
and 155,521 from lung cancer.  The relative risk of mortality associated with 
poverty was less for individuals sixty-five and older than for individuals aged 
twenty-five to sixty-four years.).  
 60.  Arloc Sherman, Public Benefits: Easing Poverty and Ensuring Medical 
Coverage, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, Aug. 17, 2005.  Cf. Amy 
Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17190, 2011) (randomized 
controlled experiment finds group of uninsured low-income Oregon adults selected 
by lottery for chance to apply for Medicaid is after one year twenty-five percentage 
points more likely to have insurance, has higher health care utilization, lower out-
of-pocket medical expenditures and debt, and better self-reported physical and 
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and income disparities in health care utilization by seniors (and 
is instrumental in documenting remaining disparities).61 
Medicare’s administrative overhead is 3.6% compared with 
other administrative costs that account for 31% of overall U.S. 
health care expenditures.62 
On the downside of the medicalization of aging, and of 
persons with disabilities, Medicare and Medicaid costs are 
significant and disproportionate compared with non-old and 
non-disabled persons, and at the expense of such opportunity 
costs as education of individuals and society, and of more 
investments in noninstitutional care, preventive care, increased 
access to health insurance for the uninsured, and the like. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEDICALIZATION OF AGING: QUALITY 
The problem of medical error, or patient safety, is 
significant.63  More people die annually from medical errors in 
U.S. hospitals (between 44,000 and 98,000) than from AIDS 
(16,516), cancer (42,297), or motor vehicle accidents (43,458).64 
Adverse incidents and deaths are ten times more likely in 
physician offices than in ambulatory surgery centers.65 The 
quality chasm in the health care system is documented in at least 
four different states, four different decades, and seven different 
 
mental health than control group that was not selected to apply for Medicaid).  
 61.  STUDY PANEL ON MEDICARE AND DISPARITIES, NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS., 
STRENGTHENING MEDICARE’S ROLE IN REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC HEALTH 
DISPARITIES 1, 9 (Bruce Vladeck et al. eds., 2006), available at http://www.calendow. 
org/uploadedFiles/strengthening_medicares_role.pdf.   
 62.  Steffie Woolhandler et al., Costs of Health Care Administration in the United 
States and Canada, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 768, 771-72 (2003). 
 63.  See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., TO ERR IS 
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). 
 64.  Id. See also Troyen K. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and 
Negligence in Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 373 (1991); Winsor C. 
Schmidt et al., Factors Associated with Medical Malpractice: Results from a Pilot Study, 7 
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 157, 160 (1991) (There were an “estimated 6,860 
deaths from negligent medical injury in New York in 1984,” while 1,777 New 
Yorkers were murdered and 2,064 died in car accidents.)  
 65.  Hector Vila, Jr. et al., Comparative Outcomes Analysis of Procedures Performed 
in Physician Offices and Ambulatory Surgery Centers, 138 ARCHIVES SURGERY 991, 993 
(2003). 
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countries.66 
Rates of adverse events increase with age (persons age 
sixty-five and older have more than double the risk of persons 
age sixteen to forty-four), and the elderly have a significantly 
higher percentage of adverse events from negligence even after 
standardizing for DRG (Diagnosis-Related Group) risk 
category.67 “Presumably, this rate means that care for the elderly 
less frequently meets the standard expected of reasonable 
medical practitioners.”68 
Drug-related adverse events account for over half of 
adverse events in hospitals, with patients age sixty-five and 
older having the highest age-specific adverse drug event rate.69 
Potentially inappropriate medication use in the U.S. nursing 
home, board and care, and community-dwelling elderly is a 
significant patient safety and cost issue.70 Pressure ulcers are not 
 
 66.  See, e.g., four states: Brennan et al., supra note 64 (New York); Don Harper 
Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study, 128 W. J. MED. 360 (1978) (California); Eric 
J. Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and 
Colorado, 38 MED. CARE, no. 3 at 261 (2000).  See, e.g., seven countries (U.S. plus six): 
G. Ross Baker et al., The Canadian Adverse Events Study, 170 J. CAN. MED. ASS’N 1678 
(2004); Peter Davis et al., Adverse Events in New Zealand Public Hospitals I: Occurrence 
and Impact, 115 N. Z. MED. J., Dec. 13, 2002, available at http://journal.nzma.org. 
nz/journal/115-1167/271/content.pdf; John D. Hamilton, The Quality of Australian 
Health Care Study: Implications for Education of Failure in Quality and Safety of Health 
Care, 13 EDUC. HEALTH 27, 29 (2000); Thomas Schiøler et al., The Incidence of Adverse 
Events in Hospitals, 163 UGESKRIFT FOR LÆGER 5331 (2001) (Denmark); Michael Soop 
et al., The Incidence of Adverse Events in Swedish Hospitals, 21 INT’L J. QUALITY 
HEALTH CARE 285 (2009); Charles Vincent et al., Adverse Events in British Hospitals, 
322 BRIT. MED. J., Mar. 3, 2001 at 517 (2001).  See also David C. Classen et al., 'Global 
Trigger Tool' Shows That Adverse Events in Hospitals May Be Ten Times Greater Than 
Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH AFF. 581, 584 (2011) (adverse events occur in one-
third of hospital admissions). 
 67.  Brennan et al., supra note 64, at 372.  
 68.  Id. at 373–74. 
 69.  See, e.g., Urmimala Sarkar et al., Adverse Drug Events in U.S. Adult 
Ambulatory Medical Care, 46 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1517, 1518 (2011); David M. Studdert 
et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical Injury Burden, Malpractice 
Litigation, and Alternative Compensation Models from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND. L. REV. 
1643, 1660, 1680 (2000); Thomas et al., supra note 66, at 265; Eric J. Thomas et al., 
Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado, 36 INQUIRY,  Fall 1999 at 255.  
 70.  See, e.g., Mark H. Beers et al., Inappropriate Medication Prescribing in Skilled-
Nursing Facilities, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 684, 684, 686 (1992); Alex Z. Fu et al., 
Potentially Inappropriate Medication Use and Healthcare Expenditures in the US 
Community-Dwelling Elderly, 45 MED. CARE 472, 472 (2007);  Denys T. Lau et al., 
Polypharmacy and Potentially Inappropriate Medication Use Among Community-Dwelling 
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uncommon and are associated with high treatment costs and 
adverse health outcomes.71 
The role that the medicalization of aging plays in the quality 
of health care does not appear favorable.  The more 
medicalization, the more there is opportunity for error and 
challenges to patient safety.  ‘First do no harm’ seems an 
important priority. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEDICALIZATION OF AGING: ACCESS 
The traditional problem of access to health care is the 
number and population of the uninsured and underinsured.  
With Medicare, older persons have less of an access problem 
than other population demographics.  Nevertheless, there are 
problems for older persons with such issues as prescription drug 
coverage,72 home health care,73 hospice care,74 and mental health 
benefits and parity.75 
 
Elders with Dementia, 24 ALZHEIMER DIS. & ASSOC. DISORD. 56 (2010); Seema D. 
Dedhiya et al., Incident Use and Outcomes Associated with Potentially Inappropriate 
Medication Use in Older Adults, 8 AM. J. GERIATRIC PHARMACOTHERAPY 562, 563, 569 
(2010); Diana L. Spore et al., Inappropriate Drug Prescriptions for Elderly Residents of 
Board and Care Facilities, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 404, 406 (1997). 
 71.  See, e.g., Dan R. Berlowitz et al., Are We Improving the Quality of Nursing 
Home Care: The Case of Pressure Ulcers, 48 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 59, 61 (2000); Dan 
R. Berlowitz et al., Effect of Pressure Ulcers on the Survival of Long-Term Care Residents, 
52A J. GERONTOLOGY: MED. SCI. M106 (1997); Madhuri Reddy et al., Preventing 
Pressure Ulcers, 296 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 974 (2006). 
 72.  See, e.g., James J. Kennedy et al., Cost-Related Nonadherence in the Medicare 
Program, 49 MED. CARE 522, 522 (2011); William H. Shrank & Niteesh K. Choudhry, 
Time to Fill the Doughnuts — Health Care Reform and Medicare Part D, 364 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 598, 599 (2011). 
 73.  See, e.g., Christina Bielaszka-DuVernay, The ‘GRACE’ Model: In-Home 
Assessments Lead To Better Care for Dual Eligibles, 30 HEALTH AFF. 431, 431–432, 434 
(2011); Harris Meyer, A New Care Paradigm Slashes Hospital Use and Nursing Home 
Stays for the Elderly and the Physically and Mentally Disabled, 30 HEALTH AFF. 412, 412 
(2011). 
 74.  See, e.g., Bridget Candy et al., Hospice Care Delivered at Home, in Nursing 
Homes and in Dedicated Hospice Facilities, 48 INT’L J. NURSING STUD. 121, 122 (2011).   
 75.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Bartels, The US System of Geriatric Mental Health Care: 
Financing and Future Challenges, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF GERIATRIC 
PSYCHIATRY 770, 771 (3d. ed. 2010); Joan K. Davitt & Zvi D. Gellis, Integrating Mental 
Health Parity for Homebound Older Adults Under the Medicare Home Health Care Benefit, 
54 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 309, 314 (2011); Margaret Knight, Access to 
Mental Health Care Among Older Adults, 37 J. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING, no. 3 at 16, 
20 (2011). 
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Upsides to medicalization of aging regarding access issues 
include the appearance of need and more successfully 
addressing the extent of unmet need.  Addressing such access 
issues carries cost and opportunity cost implications, as well as 
potential quality trade-offs. 
Downsides to medicalization of aging for such access issues 
include overutilization and the provision of unnecessary care.76 
On balance, demedicalization of aging seems a higher priority 
regarding access to care. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEDICALIZATION OF AGING: PERSONHOOD 
The important personhood questions for medicalization of 
aging include: when as a matter of law is a person no longer a 
person at the end of life?  And when as a matter of law is a 
person no longer a person because of legal incapacity? 
The medicalization of aging includes medicalization of 
death and dying.77 Legal definitions of death have historically 
 
 76.  Cf., e.g., Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in 
Medicare Spending. Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, 138 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED.  273, 273 (2003) (more inpatient-based and specialist-oriented 
patterns of practice in higher spending regions); Elliott S. Fisher, et al., The 
Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and 
Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 288, 296 (2003) (increased 
mortality risks for regions with greater end-of-life care intensity); Jack Hadley et al., 
Medical Spending and the Health of the Elderly, 46 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1333, 1357 (2011) 
(greater medical spending is associated with better health status for Medicare 
beneficiaries; search for Medicare inefficiencies should focus on effectiveness of 
specific treatment and care patterns, such as multiple chronic conditions, terminal 
illnesses near end of life, and fraudulent spending for durable medical equipment, 
home health, and hospice care); Mathew Mercuri et al., An Even Smaller Area 
Variation: Differing Practice Patterns Among Interventional Cardiologists Within a Single 
High Volume Tertiary Cardiac Centre, HEALTH POL’Y (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1, 
3–4), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168851010 
003386#FCANote (last visited Oct. 16, 2011); John E.  Wennberg, Dealing with 
Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3 HEALTH AFF., May 1984 at 6, 30 
(systematic and persistent differences in standardized rates for common surgical 
and other medical services). 
 77.  See, e.g., Suzanne Ost, The De-Medicalisation of Assisted Dying: Is a Less 
Medicalised Model the Way Forward?, 18 MED. L. REV. 497 (2010); Stephen J. Ziegler, 
Collaborated Death: An Exploration of the Swiss Model of Assisted Suicide for Its Potential 
to Enhance Oversight and Demedicalize the Dying Process, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 318 
(2009). 
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adopted medical definitions.78 The law has attempted to enhance 
individual autonomy and personhood with rights to refuse 
medical treatment even if the consequence is death.79 Some 
states (Montana,80 Oregon,81 Washington82) and countries (e.g., 
Belgium, Columbia, Netherlands, Switzerland)83 have provisions 
for aid in dying and “death with dignity,” sometimes 
medicalized as physician-assisted death or physician-assisted 
suicide. 
Even though there are perceptions that the cost of dying is 
high, available research suggests that such perceptions are not 
necessarily warranted.  For example, a 2001 study found that 
one-quarter of Medicare outlays occur in the last year of life, but 
this percentage was unchanged from the previous twenty years 
and reflects care for multiple severe illnesses typically present.84 
Even though half of people with a serious chronic illness would 
prefer to die at home, thirty-eight percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries spend some time in a nursing home in the last year 
of life, while half of Medicare cancer decedents and nineteen 
percent of Medicare decedents overall use hospice.85 
 
 78.  See, e.g., FURROW ET AL., supra note 35, at 1380–89 (defining death). 
 79.  See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990) 
(“The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior 
decisions. . . .  [W]e assume that the United States Constitution would grant a 
competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration 
and nutrition.”) 
 80.  Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d. 1211, ¶ 117 (Mont. 2009). 
 81.  OR.  REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (2009). 
 82.  WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.010–.904 (2009).  
 83.  See, e.g., FURROW ET AL., supra note 35, at 1567.  
 84.  Christopher Hogan et al., Medicare Beneficiaries’ Costs of Care in the Last Year 
of Life, 20 HEALTH AFF., July 2001 at 188, 189–192 (also, unexpectedly finding that 
African Americans have higher end-of-life costs than others).  Accord Cynthia X. 
Pan et al., Myths of the High Medical Cost of Old Age and Dying, 38 INT’L J. HEALTH 
SERV. 253 (2008). Cf. DAVID C. GOODMAN ET AL., DARTMOUTH ATLAS PROJECT, 
TRENDS AND VARIATION IN END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES WITH 
SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS (Kristen Bronner, ed., April 2011) (chronically ill Medicare 
patients spent fewer days in hospital and received more hospice care in 2007 than 
2003, but increased intensity through intensive care growth and medical specialist 
capacity for patients hospitalized; patients seeing ten or more doctors in last six 
months of life). 
 85.  Hogan, supra note 84, at 191–94. 
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Scitovsky examined the cost of dying in 2005.86 She found 
that 5.9% of Medicare enrollees who died accounted for 27.9% of 
Medicare disbursements.87 Seventy-seven percent of decedents’ 
expenses occurred in the last six months of life, forty-six percent 
in the last sixty days, and thirty percent in the last thirty days.88 
Seventy-nine percent of all inpatient hospital days occurred for 
aged beneficiaries in the last twelve months.89 There was a 
medicalization shift to dying in hospitals and institutions from 
thirty-seven percent of all deaths shortly after 1937 to sixty-three 
percent by 1980.90 Scitovsky concludes that sick people who die 
are given the same expensive medical care generally given to all 
sick people, and that predicting imminent death, or death in 
three to twelve months is “well-nigh impossible.”91 In summary, 
“the data from the studies conducted to date do not provide a 
basis for a policy of singling out one group of patients for cost-
containment strategies.”92 The key factors responsible for the 
rapid growth in health care spending include rising per capita 
incomes, costly new medical technology, workforce shortages, 
and the asymmetric distribution of market power in health care, 
not Medicare’s demographic challenges.93 
In any event, relative demedicalization through advance 
 
 86.  Anne A. Scitovsky, “The High Cost of Dying”: What Do the Data Show?, 83 
MILBANK Q. 825, 836–37 (2005).   
 87.  Id. at 831. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 834. 
 90.  Id. at 833–34. 
 91.  Id. at 826. 
 92.  Id. at 837.  See also Birgit Gielen et al., Patterns of Health Care Use and 
Expenditure During the Last 6 Months of Life in Belgium: Differences between Age 
Categories in Cancer and Non-Cancer Patients, 87 HEALTH POL’Y 53 (2010) (public 
expenditures for oldest old lower than younger decedents; recommend more 
allocation to palliative care at home); Allan Kellehear, Dementia and Dying: The Need 
for a Systematic Policy Approach, 29 CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 146 (2009) (laments 
medicalized and professionalized approach to end of life care that overemphasizes 
pharmacological management and health services, including clinical palliative care 
attending to the physical and psychological more than the social or spiritual); Johan 
J. Polder et al., Health Care Costs in the Last Year of Life—The Dutch Experience, 63 SOC. 
SCI. & MED. 1720 (2006) (expenditure on hospitals and medical services in the last 
year of life declines with increasing age at death, an inverse relationship between 
age at death and health care costs at the end of life).  
 93.  Reinhardt, supra note 53, at 37.   
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directives and hospice can save twenty-five to forty percent of 
health care costs in the last month of life, ten to seventeen 
percent in the last six months of life, and up to ten percent of 
health care costs in the last twelve months of life.94 
While there are some demedicalizing trends in death and 
dying, excessive medicalization of death and dying seems the 
prevailing and problematic paradigm. 
The medicalization of aging is also manifest in personhood 
questions about legal incapacity.  The extent of unmet need for 
legal guardianship of persons with legal incapacities is 
substantial and growing.95 This reflects individual and 
demographic medical realities as well as the service of third 
party interests, especially medical interests.96 The criteria and 
 
 94.  See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Cost Savings at the End of Life: What Do the Data 
Show?, 275 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1907, 1907 (1996).  Cf. GOODMAN, supra note 84, at 2 
(change in end-of-life care is not always in the direction toward improved chronic 
illness care that patients may prefer allowing them to remain safely out of the 
hospital). 
 95.  See David Hightower et al., Elderly Nursing Home Residents’ Need for Public 
Guardianship Services in Tennessee, 2 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 105, 120 (1990); 
Winsor C. Schmidt & Roger Peters, Legal Incompetents’ Need for Guardians in Florida, 
15 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 69 (1987); Pamela B. Teaster & Karen A. Roberto, 
Living the Life of Another: The Need for Public Guardians of Last Resort, 21 J. APPLIED 
GERONTOLOGY 176 (2002) (extent of need in Virginia). 
 96.  See, e.g., Comm’n on the Mentally Disabled & Comm’n on Legal Problems 
of the Elderly, Am. Bar Ass'n, Guardianship: An Agenda for Reform, 13 MENTAL & 
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 271, 277 (1989) (“Too often guardianships are initiated 
to meet the primary needs of parties other than the proposed ward, such as 
hospitals, nursing homes, service provider agencies, the families, commercial 
enterprises, group homes and the state.”)  See also GEORGE J. ALEXANDER & TRAVIS 
H. D. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT 135 (1972): 
 
Under the present system of “Estate Management by Preemption,” we 
divest the incompetent of control of his property upon the finding of the 
existence of serious mental illness whenever divestiture is in the interest of 
some third person or institution.  The theory of incompetency is to protect 
the debilitated from their own financial foolishness or from the fraud of 
others who would prey upon their mental weaknesses.  In practice, 
however, we seek to protect the interests of others.  The state hospital 
commences incompetency proceedings to facilitate reimbursement for 
costs incurred in the care, treatment and maintenance of its patients.  
Dependents institute proceedings to secure their needs.  Co-owners of 
property find incompetency proceedings convenient ways to secure the 
sale of realty.  Heirs institute actions to preserve their dwindling 
inheritances.  Beneficiaries of trusts or estates seek incompetency as an 
expedient method of removing as trustee one who is managing the trust or 
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procedures for legal incapacity have theoretically evolved from 
heavily medicalized criteria to more functional criteria for legal 
incapacity and more legal due process.97 Yet determination of 
legal incapacity, restoration of capacity, and management of and 
guardianship outcomes for people with legal incapacities remain 
heavily medicalized. 
Thirty states and the District of Columbia statutorily require 
a clinical evaluation of capacity during guardianship 
proceedings, fifteen states leave a clinical evaluation to the 
discretion of the court or a motion by the respondent, and five 
states have no statutory provision regarding the conduct of a 
clinical evaluation.98 The Uniform Guardianship and Protective 
Proceedings Act provides that “the court may order a 
professional evaluation of the respondent and shall order the 
evaluation if the respondent so demands.”99 The National 
Probate Court Standards advise that “The imposition of a 
guardianship by the probate court should be based on 
competent evidence of the incapacity of the respondent.”100 
One study finds that physicians almost always sign clinical 
evaluations for guardianship in Massachusetts (ninety-eight 
percent) and Pennsylvania (eighty-eight percent).101 Another 
 
estate in a manner adverse to their interests.  All of these motives may be 
honest and without any intent to cheat the aged, but none of the 
proceedings are commenced to assist the debilitated. 
 
 97.  See, e.g., WINSOR C. SCHMIDT ET AL., PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP AND THE 
ELDERLY 61–62 (1981) (compilation of state guardianship statutes); PAMELA B. 
TEASTER ET AL., PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP: IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF INCAPACITATED 
PEOPLE? 17 (2010) (includes updated compilation of guardianship statutes). 
 98.  Michael Mayhew, Survey of State Guardianship Laws: Statutory Provisions for 
Clinical Evaluations, 27 BIFOCAL 1, 14 (2005). 
 99.  Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act § 306 (1997).  A 
professional evaluation was mandatory under the 1982 Act.  Id. at cmt. 
 100.  COMMISSION ON NAT’L PROBATE COURT STANDARDS, NAT’L COLLEGE OF 
PROBATE JUDGES & NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., NATIONAL PROBATE COURT 
STANDARDS, NO. 3.3.9 (Oct. 1993). 
 101.  Jennifer Moye, Clinical Evidence in Guardianship of Older Adults Is Inadequate: 
Findings from a Tri-State Study, 47 GERONTOLOGIST 604, 608, 610 (2007) [hereinafter 
Moye, Clinical Evidence in Guardianship].  Guardianship orders for older adults are 
generally based on inadequate clinical evidence.  Much clinical evidence is 
incomplete.  The mean length of written clinical reports for guardianship of older 
adults ranges between 83 words in Massachusetts (with two-thirds of the written 
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study finds that physicians complete the clinical evaluation of 
the alleged incapacitated person ninety percent of the time in 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia.102 In Colorado, physicians 
(fifty-seven percent), psychologists (twenty-seven percent), other 
professionals (nine percent), or a multidisciplinary team (six 
percent) submit the clinical reports.103 
The outcomes of guardianship for people with legal 
incapacities also reflect the medicalization of aging.  There is a 
general lack of systematic studies in guardianship and adult 
protective services,104 but the few outcomes studies in 
guardianship are instructive and important. 
Blenkner and associates performed one of the first such 
studies through Cleveland’s Benjamin Rose Institute.  In a quasi-
experimental research design, the experimental group receiving 
enriched protective services, including guardianship, not only 
failed to have deterioration or death averted, it also had a higher 
rate of institutionalization (a medicalized disposition) and death 
than the control group.105 
 
evidence illegible) and 781 words in Colorado (one to three pages) compared to 24 
pages for the mean length of child custody evaluations.  Id. at 604, 610. Accord Kris 
Bulcroft et al., Elderly Wards and Their Legal Guardians: Analysis of County Probate 
Records in Ohio and Washington, 31 GERONTOLOGIST 156, 157, 160 (1991); Roger 
Peters et al., Guardianship of the Elderly in Tallahassee, Florida, 25 GERONTOLOGIST 532, 
537–38 (1985). See also Jennifer Moye et al., A Conceptual Model and Assessment 
Template for Capacity Evaluation in Adult Guardianship, 47 GERONTOLOGIST 591 (2007) 
(model and template for capacity evaluation in guardianship assessing medical 
condition, cognition, functional abilities, values, risk of harm and level of 
supervision needed, and means to enhance capacity); Jennifer Moye et al., Empirical 
Advances in the Assessment of the Capacity to Consent to Medical Treatment: Clinical 
Implications and Research Needs, 26 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 1054 (2006) (clinical 
judgment for capacity determination can be unreliable; no consensus regarding 
reliability and validity of instrument-based consent capacity assessment). 
 102.  Kenneth C. Dudley & R. Turner Goins, Guardianship Capacity Evaluations of 
Older Adults, 15 J. AGING & SOC. POL’Y 97, 105 (2003). Evaluation thoroughness is 
substandard.  Guardianship inefficiency is rampant in the guardianship system in 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia.  Id. at 97, 111.  
 103.  Moye, Clinical Evidence in Guardianship, supra note 101, at 608. 
 104.  See, e.g., Kathleen H. Wilber, Choice, Courts, and Competency: The Coming of 
Age of Protective Services Research, 37 GERONTOLOGIST 272, 272 (1997). 
 105.  See Margaret Blenkner et al., A Research and Demonstration Project of 
Protective Services, 52 SOC. CASEWORK 483, 498 (1971); MARGARET BLENKNER ET AL., 
BENJAMIN ROSE INST., FINAL REPORT: PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE 107, 
134, 138 (1974).  A later reanalysis by other researchers suggested that the findings 
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The issues of the use of adult protective services, including 
pursuit of guardianship, and nursing home placement were not 
“revisited in an epidemiologically rigorous fashion” until thirty 
years later.106 Linking the New Haven Established Population for 
Epidemiologic Studies in the Elderly cohort with catchment area 
adult protective services records and data from the state long-
term care registry, Lachs and associates explore “whether APS 
use for abuse and self-neglect is an independent predictor of 
[nursing home placement] after adjusting for other factors 
known to predict institutionalization (e.g., medical illness, 
functional disability, and poor social support).”107  The Lachs 
study finds that “the relative contribution of elder protective 
referral [including ‘pursuit of guardianship’] to [nursing home 
placement] is enormous [—’4- to 5-fold risk conferred by elder 
 
on death came from initial group differences not controlled by the random 
sampling, but confirmed the strong effect of membership in the experimental group 
on the institutionalization tendency. Raymond Berger & Irving Piliavin, The Effect of 
Casework: A Research Note, 21 SOC. WORK 205, 207 (1976).  Cf., e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS 
& JUANJO MEDINA-ARIZA, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, RESULTS FROM AN ELDER ABUSE 
PREVENTION EXPERIMENT IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (Sept. 2001) (“[N]ew incidents of 
abuse were more frequent among households that both received home visits and 
were in housing projects that received public education.”) But cf. Ruth E. Dunkle et 
al., Protective Services Reanalyzed: Does Casework Help or Harm?, 64 SOC. CASEWORK 
195, 195 (1983) (criticizes flaws in Blenkner study design and questions study 
conclusions). See also Winsor C. Schmidt, Adult Protective Services and the Therapeutic 
State, 10 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 101, 121 (1986) (“We should identify, segregate, and 
victimize the victimizer, rather than the victim . . . .”); Winsor C. Schmidt et al., A 
Descriptive Analysis of Professional and Volunteer Programs for the Delivery of Public 
Guardianship Services, 8 PROB. L. J. 125 (1988) (compares Florida professional and 
volunteer guardianship programs by client assessment forms, guardianship plans, 
and guardian activity reports; includes cost analysis); Pamela B. Teaster et al., Staff 
Service and Volunteer Staff Service Models for Public Guardianship and “Alternatives” 
Services: Who Is Served and With What Outcomes?, 5 J. ETHICS, L. & AGING 131 (1999) 
(compares Virginia professional and volunteer public guardianship programs by 
client assessment instruments, client care plans, and work activity logs; includes 
cost analysis). 
 106.  Mark S. Lachs et al., Adult Protective Service Use and Nursing Home 
Placement, 42 GERONTOLOGIST 734, 734 (2002).  Cf. JOHN B. WILLIAMSON, supra note 
17, at 33 (“Nursing homes present an unusually graphic example of bureaucratic, 
medical, profit-oriented, and labeling control mechanisms in operation . . . .”). 
 107.  Lachs, supra note 106, at 735.  See also S. L. Reynolds & L. D. Carson, 
Dependent on the Kindness of Strangers: Professional Guardians for Older Adults Who 
Lack Decisional Capacity, 3 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 301, 301 (1999) (explaining 
that it was more likely for wards with family guardians to be living in the 
community than wards with professional guardians). 
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mistreatment and self-neglect’—] and far exceeds the variance 
explained by other variables such as dementia, functional 
disability, and poor social networks.”108  While the Lachs 
clinicians “observed that often nursing home placement resulted 
in dramatic improvements in quality of life that was apparent to 
all observers—including [adult protective services] clients 
themselves,” the authors note: “[i]t is remarkable that controlled 
studies of differential outcomes of [adult protective services] 
have not yet been conducted.  A review of the literature shows 
no systematic attempt to evaluate program outcomes or to 
examine unintended consequences of [adult protective services] 
intervention.”109 
Such adult protective services and guardianship outcomes 
research is consistent with the earliest descriptive research and 
conclusions about guardianship.110 A legal services advocate 
concluded: “When examined in the larger context of social 
programming through which we purport to help the less 
advantaged, involuntary guardianship emerges as an official 
initiation rite for the entry of the poor and the inept into the 
 
 108.  Lachs, supra note 106, at 737–38. 
 109.  Id. at 738. 
 110.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 96, at 136. See also George J. 
Alexander, Who Benefits from Conservatorship?, 13 TRIAL, May 1977 at 30, 32 (“In 
short, then, the present California law and the law in most of the United States 
applies conservatorship: for inappropriate reasons (petitioner’s unstated motives); 
according to invalid standards (old age, designing persons); under the dubious 
pretense of medical expertise; and without seeing to the representation of the 
proposed ward.”). Cf., e.g., Joseph A. Rosenberg, Poverty, Guardianship, and the 
Vulnerable Elderly: Human Narrative and Statistical Patterns in a Snapshot of Adult 
Guardianship Cases in New York City, 16 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 315 (2009) (case 
study suggests guardianships adversely affect vulnerable elders by causing 
dislocation, diminished autonomy, and privacy infringement; hospitals may use 
guardianships to facilitate disproportionate discharges to nursing homes); Jennifer 
L. Wright, Guardianship for Your Own Good: Improving the Well-Being of Respondents 
and Wards in the USA, 33 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 350 (2010) [hereinafter Wright, 
Guardianship] (questioning the presumption that guardianship is in best interests of 
incapacitated adults by empirical research on role of internal locus of control and 
autonomy on human well-being, and finding current statutes fail to achieve 
underlying values justifying adult protective proceedings); Jennifer L. Wright, 
Protecting Who from What, and Why, and How?: A Proposal for an Integrative Approach 
to Adult Protective Proceedings, 12 ELDER. L. J. 53 (2004) [hereinafter Wright, 
Protecting] (arguing that adult guardianship and parens patriae civil commitment 
should be integrated).   
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[medically] managed society.”111 In short, 
Recognize guardianship for what it really is: the most 
intrusive, non-interest serving, impersonal legal device 
known and available to us and as such, one which 
minimizes personal autonomy and respect for the 
individual, has a high potential for doing harm and 
raises at best a questionable benefit/burden ratio.  As 
such, it is a device to be studiously avoided.112 
Another example of the medicalization of aging in 
personhood issues about legal incapacity is the practice of 
physicians serving as de facto guardians.  Despite the legal 
requirement that non-emergency medical treatment occurs only 
with patient or surrogate consent, there is a significant incidence 
of unconsented medical service to patients who lack both 
decision-making capacity and a surrogate decision-maker.  At 
least 16% of patients admitted to medical intensive care units 
(ICU) of hospitals lack capacity and a surrogate while 
accounting for 5.5% to 27% of ICU deaths.113 Compared with 
other ICU patients, these patients are more likely white, male, 
and age sixty-five or older.114 An estimated one-third of 
incapacitated nursing home residents do not have a surrogate 
 
 111.  Annina M. Mitchell, Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents: A Strategy for 
Legal Services Advocates, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 451, 466 (1978). 
 112.  Elias Cohen, Protective Services and Public Guardianship: A Dissenting 
View, Address at 31st Annual Meeting of the Gerontological Society, Dallas (Nov. 
20, 1978).    
Guardianship represents a failure to execute appropriate planning and advance 
directives.  Cf., e.g., Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. 
(requiring hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, hospice 
programs, and health maintenance organizations receiving Medicare and Medicaid 
to provide each patient with information about rights to accept or refuse treatment, 
to formulate advance directives, to document whether an advance directive is 
signed, to assure related state law is followed, and provide for education of staff 
and public about advance directives); MARSHALL B. KAPP, THE LAW AND OLDER 
PERSONS: IS GERIATRIC JURISPRUDENCE THERAPEUTIC? 143–56 (2003) (discussing 
Patient Self-Determination Act). 
 113.  Douglas B. White et al., Decisions to Limit Life-Sustaining Treatment for 
Critically Ill Patients Who Lack Both Decision-Making Capacity and Surrogate Decision-
Makers, 34 CRITICAL CARE MED. 2053, 2055‒56 (2006) [hereinafter White, Decisions]; 
Douglas B. White et al., Life Support for Patients Without a Surrogate Decision Maker: 
Who Decides?, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 34, 36 (2007) [hereinafter White, Life 
Support].  
 114.  White, Decisions, supra note 113, at 2054. 
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available to make DNR order decisions.115 Contrary to law, 
physicians make many important medical decisions for 
incapacitated patients without surrogates and without judicial 
review.116 Physicians not only rarely receive training in legal 
competence evaluations,117 they also rarely receive training or 
certification in guardianship.118 
 
 115.  See Andrew M. Fader, Implementing a “Do-Not-Resuscitate” (DNR) Policy in a 
Nursing Home, 37 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 544, 547 (explaining that 45% of 
incapacitated nursing home residents’ surrogates did not respond within three 
months when asked about the DNR wishes of their wards, but the authors intended 
to follow up after the study was published). 
 116.  See Robin J. Bandy et al., Medical Decision-Making During the Guardianship 
Process for Incapacitated, Hospitalized Adults: A Descriptive Cohort Study, 25 J. GEN. 
INTERNAL MED. 1003, 1006 (2010); White, Decisions, supra note 113, at 2053; White, 
Life Support, supra note 113, at 34.  Cf., e.g., University of Louisville Hospital Policy, 
No. 600-140, Informed Consent (rev. Dec. 2010), available at 
http://www.uoflhealthcare.org/Default.aspx?tabid=526 (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).  
If it is not possible to obtain a timely court order, then two attending 
physicians (one of whom is not involved in the patient’s care) will confer 
and based on their best medical judgment, determine what care is in the 
patient’s best interests.  Note: the determination regarding treatment in the 
patient’s best interests shall be made in coordination with Social Services’ 
efforts to address the patient’s guardianship needs.  
Id. (emphasis in original); University of Louisville Hospital Policy, No. 600-158, 
Recognizing Patient Autonomy Decision Making (rev. Feb. 2003), available at 
http://www.uoflhealthcare.org/ Default.aspx?tabid=526 (last visited Aug. 25, 2011) 
(“If the patient requires urgent care or treatment and the health care decision maker 
is absent or unavailable, two (2) licensed attending physicians not involved in the 
patient’s care” may consent to treatment.)  Medical treatment may occur in 
Kentucky on the authority of: (a) a valid informed consent, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
304.40-320(1) (West 2011); (b) "an emergency situation where consent of the patient 
cannot reasonably be obtained before providing health care services,” § 
304.40‒320(3); (c) authorized responsible parties (not including an attending 
physician), § 311.631(1) (2011); or (d) by a court exercising the powers of a limited 
guardian, or appointing an individual or agency to exercise such powers if "there is 
danger of serious impairment to the health or safety of the respondent," § 
387.740(1).   
 117.  Dudley & Goins, supra note 102, at 112. 
 118.  Fifteen states have some provision for professional guardian licensing, 
certification, or registration, almost all with some provision for guardianship 
training or examination.  Winsor C. Schmidt et al., Study Finds Certified Guardians 
with Legal Work Experience are at Greater Risk for Elder Abuse than Certified Guardians 
with Other Work Experience, VII NAELA J. 171, 178 (2011).  The state of Washington’s 
Professional Guardian Certification Program training requires completion of three 
courses offered by the University of Washington and consisting of fifty-six 
classroom hours and forty-four online distance education hours. Professional 
Guardian Certification Program, WASH. CTS., http://www.courts.wa.gov/ 
committee/?fa=committee.display&item_id=845&committee_id=115 (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2011).  
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The problems with surrogate decision-making for patients 
by physicians in ICUs, general hospital wards, and skilled-
nursing facilities are myriad.  Such decision-making by 
physicians (a) is inconsistent with the Ethics Manual of the 
American College of Physicians;119 (b) does not provide 
“adequate safeguards to [assure] that decisions for these patients 
[(critically ill patients lacking decision-making capacity and 
surrogates)] are fair and consistent”;120 (c) is erroneously based 
on “problematic” subjective criteria, “such as the patients’ 
anticipated quality of life, [the physician’s] own perception of 
what was in the patients’ best interest, and concerns about 
appropriate resource allocation”;121 (d) assesses patient quality of 
life systematically lower than patient assessment;122 (e) chooses 
less aggressive treatment for homeless or marginally housed 
patients than the patients choose;123 (f) presents potential 
physician conflict of interest, and presents absence of patient 
due process;124 and (g) “may result in similarly situated patients 
receiving different levels of treatment” because of wide variation 
in physician beliefs about limiting life-sustaining treatment.125 
Also, (a) considering that the medical literature126 
documents potential physician conflict of interest when a 
physician renders a surrogate consent decision for his or her 
own patient, or a colleague’s patient, or for the physician’s 
hospital’s patient, and (b) considering that the medical literature 
documents the “concern that, depending on the reimbursement 
structure of the . . . hospital, there may be a systematic bias in 
 
 119.  See White, Life Support, supra note 113, at 34; Lois Snyder & Cathy Leffler, 
Position Paper, Ethics Manual: Fifth Edition, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 560, 567 
(2005).  
 120.  White, Decisions, supra note 113, at 2058. 
 121.  Id. at 2057. 
 122.  Id. (citing Robert A. Pearlman & Richard F. Uhlmann, Quality of Life in 
Chronic Diseases: Perceptions of Elderly Patients, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY: MED. SCI. M25, 
M30 (1988)). 
 123.  See Wendi M. Norris et al., Treatment Preferences for Resuscitation and Critical 
Care Among Homeless Persons, 127 CHEST 2180, 2181 (2005).  
 124.  White, Decisions, supra note 113, at 2058.   
 125.  Id.  
 126.  E.g., id.   
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favor of either overtreatment or undertreatment of these 
patients,”127 there may be legal risk regarding “false claims” for 
Medicaid (and Medicare) reimbursement under the various 
federal civil and criminal statutes, and regarding risk under the 
Stark Law (governing physician self-referral) and federal and 
state “fraud and abuse” statutes.128  Depending on the 
reimbursement claims in these cases, there may be problems, at 
least conceptually, with financial benefit that occurs from 
conflict of interest, or from either overtreatment or 
undertreatment of patients who lack a legally authorized 
consent. 
While some demedicalization has occurred in statutory 
criteria for legal incapacity, excessive medicalization of 
guardianship seems to prevail, as with the other important 
medicalization of aging personhood issue, death and dying. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEDICALIZATION OF AGING: THERAPEUTIC 
STATE 
A critical view of law and aging, or elder law, sees a 
dramatic historical shift of public policy about aging from 
concerns about equity and social justice to preoccupation with 
efficiency and cost containment.129 While Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid achieved a sea of change in the reduced 
incidence of poverty and improved quality of life for older 
persons, the preoccupations with cost containment in the late 
twentieth century arguably changed the function and political 
economy of elder law and policy from social justice to social 
control. 
 Probably the most important point made by theorists 
of social control is that the nature or face of control has 
changed over the past 100 years; not only are targets 
told they are responsible for their plight, they are also 
 
 127.  Id. at 2057. 
 128.  See generally C. Dean Furman, Special Article, The Federal False Claims Act: 
The Dangers of Ignorance, 105 KY. MED. ASS’N J. 23 (2007).   
 129.  See WILLIAMSON, supra note 17, at 38. 
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led to believe that their loss of autonomy and relegation 
to others’ care is for their own good.  Essentially, social 
control mechanisms have been altered in two major, yet 
overlapping ways.  First, enlightened bureaucratic 
management, through the use of policy and law, has 
replaced informal controls of the primary group and 
overtly coercive powers of the state as the most 
pervasive sources of control. 
. . . . 
 Second, the major agents of control are no longer 
sweatshop employers or law enforcement agents.  
Rather the benign bureaucratic model overlaps with a 
medical model of control, and psychiatrists and other 
medical personnel play a major part in defining 
people’s possibilities in life. . . . [M]ental hygiene is not 
so much a science for preventing mental disorder as a 
science for the prevention of moral delinquency.130 
Kittrie identified a “new hybrid system of social controls” 
which he designated as the therapeutic state.131 The therapeutic 
state is distinct from the welfare state, which includes aid to the 
poor, public education, housing assistance, retirement benefits, 
medical care, and possibly guaranteed income (not to mention 
corporate welfare).132 “The welfare state makes services available 
to voluntary consumers; the therapeutic state assumes that its 
clients are too incompetent to be voluntary or to realize the 
beneficence of the proffered assistance and therefore attempts to 
administer its services involuntarily.”133 
Dangers of the therapeutic state lie in the conditioning of 
society to consider those with a label of deviance, like the 
elderly, as “‘different,’ rarely considering the possibility that 
deviance could easily be broadened to encompass many 
unsuspecting candidates.”134 
The danger . . . exists that in the implementation of the 
 
 130.  Id. at 32 (internal citations omitted). Williamson at al. account for the extent 
of social control experienced by older persons from historical, cultural, and social 
perspectives.  See id.   
 131.  KITTRIE, supra note 5, at 40. 
 132.  Id. at 10, 41.  See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE 
(Bantom Books 1967) (1960). 
 133.  SCHMIDT et al., supra note 97, at 9.  See KITTRIE, supra note 5, at 41. 
 134.  KITTRIE, supra note 5, at 361.  
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rehabilitative ideal, the social-defense role will gain 
ascendancy, leaving the individual with little or no 
protection from the powers of the therapeutic state. . . .  
More and more persons will find themselves subject to 
compulsory treatment for the well-being of society in 
general with little or no protections offered against 
error, abuse, oversights, or untoward infringements of 
privacy.  At that time we would truly be near the Brave 
New World.135 
With the Brave New World of the therapeutic state and the 
medicalization of deviance like aging, constitutional safeguards 
and individual rights are circumvented or lost in the name of 
health.136 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEDICALIZATION OF AGING: THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE 
One of the more recent manifestations of the therapeutic 
state is therapeutic jurisprudence.  Therapeutic jurisprudence, 
“the role of the law as a therapeutic agent,”137 studies “the use of 
the law to achieve therapeutic objectives.”138 Therapeutic 
jurisprudence is an “antidote” to the judicial-opinion-based 
“doctrinal, constitutional, and rights-oriented” approach 
reached by mental health law.139 Traditional mental health law 
extended rights in constitutional criminal procedure to the 
mental health system, but allegedly grew “sterile” with 
increased social conservatism and changes in composition of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.140 Therapeutic jurisprudence examines “the 
 
 135.  Id. at 401. 
 136.  See CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 257; see generally KITTRIE, supra 
note 5.  See also Special Issue, Challenging the Therapeutic State: Critical Perspectives on 
Psychiatry and the Mental Health System, 11 J. MIND & BEHAV. 247 (David Cohen, ed. 
1990).  
 137.  DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE 8 (1991). 
 138.  DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A 
THERAPEUTIC AGENT 4 (1990). 
 139.  WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 137, at 3, 7. 
 140.  Id. at 4–5.  Cf. Bruce J. Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. L. 
BULL.  101 (1971) (standards and procedures for involuntary confinement for mental 
illness should be no less than for criminal defendants). 
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extent to which substantive rules, legal procedures, and the roles 
of lawyers and judges produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic 
consequences.”141 Therapeutic jurisprudence has produced a 
considerable literature in mental health law, as well as in such 
other fields of law as criminal law, tort, and contract.142 Elder 
law is subject to therapeutic jurisprudence analyses.143 
While the founders of therapeutic jurisprudence deny 
(intentions) that therapeutic jurisprudence supports or calls for a 
return to the therapeutic state,144 significant criticisms of 
 
 141.  WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 137, at ix.   
A 9-cell matrix with Therapeutic, Neutral, and Antitherapeutic on the vertical 
axis, and Substantive Law, Legal Procedure, and Legal Role on the horizontal axis 
encourages therapeutic jurisprudence conclusions about whether any particular 
law, procedure, or role is therapeutic, antitherapeutic, both, or neither.  Wexler, 
supra note 138, at 4–5.  Cf., John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Science in Law, 
at v (6th ed. 2006) (describing the 4-cell matrix for social science in law with Law 
and Social Science on the horizontal axis and Substance and Method on the vertical 
axis; social science in law jurisprudence is a tool in law for analysis of the resulting 
four subtopics: substantive law (“the legal rules which make the involvement [of 
social science in law] relevant”); legal method (“the process of managing the 
involvement [of social science in law”]; social science findings (“the relevant 
research results”); and social science method (“the techniques of carrying out and 
analyzing that research”). Id. From a social science in law perspective, conceptual 
challenges for therapeutic jurisprudence include: legal method issues about the 
legally appropriate methods of using social science; social science method issues 
about research design (e.g., causation, internal and external validity); issues about 
the admissibility of social science findings at trial and on appeal as “adjudicative 
facts” or “social authority”; social science findings as “legislative facts”; and, social 
science findings as context or “social framework” for predicting future facts, 
determining present facts, and determining past facts.  See generally id.  Social 
science in law jurisprudence may provide a more objective, neutral, or even 
determinative perspective than therapeutic jurisprudence.   
In contrast to the “analogical reasoning” of traditional legal doctrinal analysis, 
the typical “creative/analytical process” for therapeutic jurisprudence includes an 
introduction, a description of the pertinent law, a section on the pertinent 
psychology, an integrative section applying or “relating the psychology to the law,” 
and a conclusion. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 137, at 13–14.   
 142.  See, e.g., references cited by MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL , 534–44, supp. 136–47 (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2009); Wright, 
Guardianship, supra note 110, at 357; see Wright, Protecting, supra note 110, at 73. 
 143.  See, e.g., KAPP, supra note 112; Daniel C. Marson et al, Testamentary Capacity 
and Undue Influence in the Elderly: A Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective, 28 L. & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 71 (2004); Dennis P. Stolle, Professional Responsibility in Elder Law: A 
Synthesis of Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 459 
(1996).  But see, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 5, at 125–26 and 133–37 for critical 
assessments of The Law and Older Persons.  
 144.  See WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 137, at xi (“Let us, at the outset, 
emphasize that therapeutic jurisprudence does not embrace a vision of law or even 
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therapeutic jurisprudence at least keep the concern alive.145 
Petrila criticizes therapeutic jurisprudence: (1) for assuming 
that therapeutic outcomes should have a dominant, or any, role 
in judicial decision making; (2) for representing that therapeutic 
jurisprudence is a new approach to mental health law issues; (3) 
for ignoring the “consumer/survivor movement” in assuming 
“‘general agreement that, other things being equal, mental health 
law should be restructured to better accomplish therapeutic 
values;’” and (4) for significantly failing to question “who 
decides” whether there is a therapeutic outcome and largely 
 
of mental health law as serving exclusively or primarily therapeutic ends.  We do 
not call for a return to the ‘therapeutic state’ or extol what Wexler once called 
‘therapeutic justice.’”); David B. Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
Breaking the Bounds of Conventional Mental Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. RTS. 759, 762 (1993) (“Therapeutic jurisprudence in no way supports 
paternalism, coercion, or a therapeutic state.  It in no way suggests that therapeutic 
considerations should trump other considerations such as autonomy, integrity of 
the fact-finding process, community safety, and many more.”).  
 145.  Joel Haycock, Speaking Truth to Power: Rights, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and 
Massachusetts Mental Health Law, 20 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 
315 (1993–94) (“But if therapeutic jurisprudence is construed as a shift from, or an 
alternative to, rights-based perspectives, then real risks exist.”); John Petrila, 
Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 877, 890 (1993) (reviewing WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 
137):    
First, . . . the authors assume “general agreement that, other things being 
equal, mental health law should be restructured to better accomplish 
therapeutic values.”  This assumption on its face is highly questionable.  
Criticisms of the “therapeutic state” are common in both popular and 
professional literature; the views of people who do not share the belief that 
law should be devoted to accomplishing therapeutic values should not 
simply be discounted. 
(internal citations omitted).  Cf. Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five 
Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 193, 211-214 (1995) (Under the 
“‘Internal’ Balancing” dilemma, while Wexler has asserted that therapeutic 
jurisprudence “‘in no way supports paternalism, coercion, or the therapeutic state,’” 
the logic of therapeutic jurisprudence “may obscure any values encapsulated in the 
Constitution not connected with therapeutic results,” and, “[i]n short, . . . could 
undermine the normative premises of the legal system.”).  But cf. David B. Wexler, 
Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 220, 
230 (1995) (“[M]icroanalytic therapeutic jurisprudence has in no way sought to 
construct a Therapeutic State: Therapeutic jurisprudence has been playing at the 
fringe of the mental health care tapestry and has not been designing the larger 
pattern.”); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Patients, Professionals, and the Path of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Response to Petrila, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 907 
(1993). 
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ignoring the people subjected to therapeutic jurisprudence.146 
“Therapeutic jurisprudence as it has been conceptualized to date 
is a conservative, arguably paternalistic, approach to mental 
disability law.”147 Petrila found no federal or state court cases 
using the term “therapeutic jurisprudence.”148 
From a medicalization of aging perspective, realization of 
therapeutic jurisprudence seems to enhance medicalization.  Do 
therapeutic means or consequences achieve just ends?  Should 
Lady Justice practice medicine?  Should law strive for therapy or 
justice?  Elder law should arguably refocus on constitutional 
safeguards and individual rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article is to describe and assess the upside 
and the downside of the medicalization of aging.  The 
medicalization of aging seems to unnecessarily increase health 
care costs, unnecessarily increase opportunity for medical error, 
unnecessarily increase inappropriate utilization, needlessly 
medicalize death and dying, needlessly medicalize legal 
incapacity, and threateningly facilitate enhancement of the 
therapeutic state, including the therapeutic jurisprudence of the 
therapeutic state. 
Regarding the favorable aspects of medicalization of aging, 
there are arguable benefits to medicalizing general social deviance 
and transferring morally problematic general social problems from 
law to medicine.  Medicine can appear more scientific and 
objective.  Morally problematic social problems may receive a 
more sympathetic and less judgmental hearing from physicians 
and medicine than from law.  Medical treatment of social 
 
 146.  Petrila, supra note 145, at 877, 881, 891 (quoting WEXLER & WINICK, supra 
note 137, at xii). 
 147.  Id. at 881. 
 148.  Id. at 878 n.6. 
For further analysis of responses to Petrila by Wexler and Winick, and 
Slobogin’s examination of five conundrums challenging therapeutic jurisprudence 
see, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 5, at 127–28.  See generally Slobogin, supra note 145; 
Wexler & Winick, supra note 145.  
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problems may cost less than social control systems like jails and 
prisons and offer the possibility of rehabilitation and cure.  The 
sick role exempts individual social responsibility and provides 
exemption from normal social responsibilities.149 Medicalizing 
social problems may reduce the need for law to successfully 
retribute, deter, incapacitate, and otherwise achieve and 
maintain social control.  If war is merely politics by other 
means,150 then medicalization of general social deviance is 
merely law and social control by other means. 
Favorable aspects to medicalizing the social deviance of aging 
and transferring morally problematic social problems of aging from 
law to medicine are not so clear.  Nonetheless, the morally 
problematic social problems of aging subject to medical ethical 
requirements151 of nonmaleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and 
justice152 (e.g., fair, equitable distribution) may receive a more 
sympathetic and less judgmental hearing from physicians and 
medicine than from law.  Medicine and physicians can appear 
more scientific and objective about elder and disabled patients.  
The “arc, end, and prolongation of life”153 with medicalization 
are subject from ethical requirements to erring on the side of 
medical diagnosis, treatment, and life extension seemingly 
regardless of cost.  Individual and community medical treatment 
of social problems in aging may cost less than social control 
systems like mental institutions and long term care facilities, and 
offer the possibility of rehabilitation and cure.  The sick role in 
aging exempts individual social responsibility for successful 
planning and implementation, and provides exemption from 
normal social responsibilities of healthy people.  Medicalizing 
 
 149.  See PARSONS, supra note 5.  
 150.  CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1 ON WAR 23 (J. J. Graham trans., new & rev. ed., 
5th impr. 1949) (“We see, therefore, that War is not merely a political act, but also a 
real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the 
same by other means.”).  
 151.  See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (6th ed. 2009); BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A 
GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS (4th ed. 2009). 
 152.  See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 241. 
 153.  Kaufman et al., supra note 30, at 732.  
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social problems in aging may reduce the need for law to 
successfully achieve and maintain social control.  If war is 
merely politics by other means, then medicalization of aging is 
merely law and social control by other means. 
Regarding drawbacks to medicalizing the social deviance of 
aging and transferring morally problematic social problems of aging 
from law to medicine, medicine is not necessarily scientific and 
objective.  There is much art and discretion to medicine that 
escapes accountability in law.  The morally problematic social 
problems of aging subject to medical ethical requirements of 
nonmaleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and justice may get no 
hearing from law.  The “arc, end, and prolongation of life” with 
medicalization err on the side of medical diagnosis, treatment, 
and life extension seemingly regardless of cost, and with 
significant challenges to individual autonomy and individual 
and social preference to not medicalize life, to not needlessly 
prolong life, and ultimately to end life in a demedicalized 
manner.  A medicalized sick role in aging makes the person a 
patient, a disease, illness, sickness, disorder, or syndrome, with 
less personhood and less of a person.  Choice, planning, 
implementation, and responsibility are diminished.  Normal 
social responsibilities are excused.  Medicalizing social problems 
in aging reduces law and rule by law and substitutes rule by 
medicine.  If medicalization of aging is law and social control by 
other means, it may constitute the moral equivalent of war as 
merely politics by other means. 
 
